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SUBSTITUTION OF FOREIGN EXECUTORS:
THE NEED FOR LEGIsLATION
State ex rel. Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Rooney, 402 S.W.2d 354 (Mo. 1966)
The problem raised here is whether a plaintiff in a Missouri court,
suing a nonresident defendant, may substitute the defendant's nonresident
executor upon the death of the nonresident. Charles F. Curry & Company,
a Missouri corporation, had purchased an airplane from Wyatt Hedrick, a
Texas resident. The plane failed to meet the Federal Aviation Agency's
standards, contrary to Hedrick's alleged representations, and was grounded.
Hedrick made the necessary adjustments at his field in Texas, but re-
fused to return the plane unless Curry & Company waived any claim for
loss of the use while the plane was being repaired. The company declined
to do so and demanded its aircraft; Hedrick again refused to return it.
Curry & Company, after attaching1 Hedrick's Missouri property, com-
menced suit in a Missouri county court seeking ordinary and punitive dam-
ages for conversion of the airplane and damages for breach of warranty.
Hedrick appeared, dissolved the attachment,2 and successfully defended
the suit. The effect of dissolution in Missouri is to change the nature of
the action from in rem to in personam? The plaintiff appealed to the
Missouri Supreme Court, which found on plaintiff's behalf that there had
been a conversion. A new trial was ordered to determine damages.4 Be-
fore the new trial could commence, Hedrick died. Curry & Company
moved to substitute the defendant's executor, a Dallas, Texas bank, as
the "proper party."' Appearing specially,' the executor moved to quash
process and to deny the substitution. When the trial judge notified the
parties that he would overrule the motion and allow the substitution, the
1. See Mo. Rav. STAT. § 521.010 (1959).
2. Mo. REV. STAT. § 521.480 (1959). In order to dissolve an attachment, unless
there is a defect in the attachment papers, the owner must put up a bond for twice the
value of the attached property.
3. Mo. REv. STAT. § 521.490(2) (1959):
When any attachment shall be dissolved, all proceedings touching the property
and effects attached, and the garnishee summoned, shall be vacated, and the suit
shall proceed as if it had been commenced by summons only.
4. Charles F. Curry & Co. v. Hedrick, 378 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. 1964).
5. See note 39 infra and accompanying text.
6. In Missouri, a party may appear specially to question service of process and juris-
diction. "The special appearance of defendant did not confer on the court jurisdiction
of his person, or waive jurisdiction defects." Beckmann v. Beckmann, 358 Mo. 1029,
1034, 218 S.W.2d 566, 570 (1949).
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executor sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial judge from pro-
ceeding. The Missouri Supreme Court granted the writ on the ground,
in part, that express statutory authority is necessary to substitute a foreign
executor as party defendant,7 and for those cases in which the nonresident
defendant dies no such authority exists in Missouri.
This Missouri decision is consistent with the long established rule that an
administrator,' in the absence of some ancillary proceeding, could neither
sue nor be sued outside the state that appointed him.9 Today, however,
the foreign administrator's immunity is not sacrosanct, particularly under
nonresident motorist statutes. Faced with the economic realities and in-
convenience of residents' having to sue in a foreign state, most legislatures
have provided a means by which a local plaintiff could sue in a local forum
a nonresident who used the forum's highways and was involved in an acci-
dent. These early statutes made no provision for substituting a decedent
defendant's administrator. This produced the anomalous result of allowing
suit against a living nonresident but not against his estate. A majority of
states have now revised their statutes to provide for substitution of, and
service upon, the administrator."0 Nearly all of these statutes either by in-
7. State ex rel. Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Rooney, 402 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Mo. 1966).
Many courts take this position, although they fail to explain why this is so. See, e.g., Na-
tional Bank v. Mitchell, 154 Kan. 276, 118 P.2d 519 (1941); Riggs v. Schneider's Ex'r,
279 Ky. 361, 130 S.W.2d 816 (1939); Conley v. Huntoon, 37 R.I. 343, 92 A. 865
(1915); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 512, Comment b (Tent. Draft
No. 11, 1965).
8. For purposes of this comment, the term "administrator" will be used to include
executor and personal representative of a decedent.
9. E.g., Vaughnan v. Northrup, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 1 (1841); Jefferson v. Beall, 117
Ala. 436, 23 So. 44 (1898); A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 23 (1962); H.
GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 190 (4th ed. Scoles 1964); R. LEFLAR, CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 194 (1959); G. STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 405 (3d ed. 1963). For an
excellent review of the reasons, both real and fancied, for the immunity rule, see Currie,
The Multiple Personality of the Dead: Executors, Administrators, and Conflict of Laws,
33 U. Chi. L. REv. 429, 447 (1966).
10. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 199 (Supp. 1965). ARx. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-342.1, -342.3
(Supp. 1965); CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§ 17450-56 (Deering 1959); CONN. GEN. STAT.
Rav. § 52-62 (Supp. 1965); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3112 (Supp. 1966); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 40-423 (1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 47.29(2) (Supp. 1966); GA. CODE
ANN. § 68-810 (1957); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-1043 (1965); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 8-401, -402 (1963); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 188.020 (1963); LA. Rnv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-3474 (Supp. 1966); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66V2, § 115 (1967); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 90, § 3A (Supp. 1966); MAIc. STAT. ANN. § 9.2103 (1960); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 170.55 (1960); MISS. CODE ANN. § 9352-61 (Supp. 1966); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 506.210 (Supp. 1966); NEB. Rav. STAT. § 25-530(3) (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
39:7-2 (1961); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-24-3 (1960); N.Y. VEE. TRAP. LAW § 253
(McKinney 1960); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-105 (Supp. 1965); N.D. CENT. CODE §
39-01-11 (1960); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2703.20 (Page 1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
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terpretation or explicit coverage, include foreign administrators and have
been upheld when so applied."
Some state legislatures have recently enacted general "long-arm" sta-
tutes; these bind the nonresident and his administrator to jurisdiction for
a variety of acts of the nonresident in the state in addition to use of the
highways. These statutes typically cover: transacting business within the
state; contracting to supply services or goods in the state; causing tortious
injuries in the state by either acts or omissions occurring outside the state;
having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in the state. 2 Ill-
inois' version of this type of statute was recently upheld in a case evidenc-
ing the Illinois court's favorable attitude towards this statute. 3 The court
stated that the old immunity rule "must give way to legislative enact-
ments."' 4
The arguments made to extend jurisdiction over nonresident motorists
and their administrators, essentially convenience and fairness, have been
applied with considerable success to other acts of nonresidents within the
forum state. In spite of the due process problems" and the traditional ar-
guments in favor of unified administration of estates and immunity,"8 legis-
latures continue to extend the jurisdiction of their courts. Missouri is not
unusual in this regard.
Although Missouri does not have a general "long-arm" statute, its legis-
lature has by separate acts provided for jurisdiction over, and service upon,
tit. 47, § 391 (1962); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 2001 (1960); S.D. CODE § 33.0809
(Supp. 1960); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-224 to -226 (Supp. 1965); TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. art. 2039a (1964); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-67.1 (Supp. 1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
345.09 (Supp. 1967); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-52 (Supp. 1965).
11. E.g., Oviatt v. Garretson, 205 Ark. 792, 171 S.W.2d 287 (1943) ; Plopa v. DuPre,
327 Mich. 660, 42 N.W.2d 777 (1950); State ex rel. Sullivan v. Cross, 314 S.W.2d 889
(Mo. 1958); Leighton v. Roper, 300 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E.2d 876 (1950). Contra, Knoop
v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Iowa 1947).
12. E.g., ARx. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-2501-2507 (Supp. 1965); IDAHO CODE ANN. §
5-514 (Supp. 1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Supp. 1966); KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-308 (b) (1964); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.705 (1962).
13. Hayden v. Wheeler, 33 Ill. 2d 110, 210 N.E.2d 495 (1965).
14. Id. at 113, 210 N.E.2d at 497.
15. That the states' power over nonresidents has been expanding is a proposition
familiar to us all from a historic line of cases: Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) ;
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945); see Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Per-
sonam Jurisdiction of State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. Cm.
L. REv. 569 (1958). For an analysis of how Missouri courts have handled the various
tests such as "minimum contacts," see Anderson, Personal Jurisdiction Over Outsiders, 28
Mo. L. REv. 336, 368 (1963).
16. See note 9 supra.
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the following nonresidents: foreign savings and loan associations,' 7 foreign
corporations legally qualified to do business in the state,'" authorized and
unauthorized foreign insurance companies, 9 foreign fraternal benefit so-
cieties,2" foreign mutual insurance companies,2 nonresident securities is-
suers,2 foreign banking corporations," foreign corporate fiduciaries,2 ad-
jacent-state rural electric cooperatives, 5 nonresident milk manufacturers
and processors," nonresident motor carriers," nonresident motorists,28 and
nonresident watercraft owners." Although most of these statutes apply
only to corporations, the last two represent explicit extensions of jurisdic-
tion over individual nonresidents. In spite of these statutes, however, Mis-
souri residents have experienced some difficulties in trying to utilize the
extended jurisdiction of the courts.
When the first Missouri nonresident motorist statute 0 reached the su-
preme court in Harris v. Bates,3' it was found unconstitutional because:
1) the statute failed to subject explicitly the nonresident's administrator to
jurisdiction, and 2) the statute failed to provide for service upon the non-
resident administrator. The court said that, in order to satisfy due process
requirements, statutory provisions must expressly subject a person to the
jurisdiction of the court and provide for service of process calculated to
reach the party subjected to jurisdiction.32 Subsequently revised, the sta-
tute explicitly included administrators and provided for service of process.33
In State ex rel. Sullivan v. Cross,34 the revision was held to meet the stan-
dards set forth in the Harris case.
17. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 369.580 (1959).
18. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 351.630 (1959).
19. Mo. REv. STAT. § 375.210 (1959) (authorized); Mo. REV. STAT. § 375.160
(1959) (unauthorized).
20. Mo. Rnv. STAT. §§ 378.400-.410 (1959).
21. Mo. REv. STAT. § 379.280 (1959).
22. Mo. Rsv. STAT. § 409.100 (1959).
23. Mo. Lv. STAT. § 362.435 (1959).
24. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 363.205 (1959).
25. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 394.200 (1959).
26. Mo. Rnv. STAT. §§ 416.510-.560 (1959).
27. Mo. REv. STAT. § 508.070 (Supp. 1965).
28. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 506.210 (1959).
29. Mo. Rv. STAT. §§ 506.330-.340 (1959).
30. Mo. Laws 1941, 435 § 1.
31. 364 Mo. 1023, 270 S.W.2d 763 (1954).
32. Id. at 1028, 270 S.W.2d at 767.
33. Mo. REv. STAT. § 506.210 (Supp. 1966). This provided in part: "[a]n agree-
ment by him [the nonresident motorist] that he, his executor, administrator or other legal
representative shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts ... ." Subsection (2) pro-
vides that service may be made upon these persons through the Secretary of State.
34. 314 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. 1958).
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A lack of specificity in another statute brought about a similar sequence
of events. The statute allowed a suit to be brought against an unregistered
corporate tortfeasor;" process was to be mailed by the Secretary of State
according to the address in his records. Of course, there would be no
record of an unregistered foreign corporation, so that plantiffs would have
to supply the needed address. The supreme court held that "even actual
notice, gratuitously furnished under a statute which does not contain ade-
quate requirements for notice, is insufficient." '36 The legislature has now
amended the statute so that if the Secretary does not have an address,
plaintiffs shall provide it by consulting the official registry of the state that
incorporated the alleged tortfeasor.'7
Given the fact that the Missouri Supreme Court consistently has re-
quired specification of who is subject to jurisdiction and how service is to
be made, one could have easily predicted the result of the executor's no-
tion for a writ of prohibition in this case. The plaintiff in Rooney argued
that the decedent had submitted to jurisdiction, thereby conferring juris-
diction over his administrator, and that the administrator was a "proper
party" for substitution." The latter contention could have been argued
by relying on the fact that the Missouri substitution rule is modeled after
the federal rule." Both provide that if a party dies, the court may substi-
tute the "proper party." The federal courts have applied their rule to
foreign administrators."0 The Missouri court's power to construe proced-
ural rules4 should be employed to effectuate the rules' purpose-"to sim-
35. Mo. Laws 1943, 410 § 105.
36. State ex rel. Pressner v. Scott, 387 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Mo. 1965).
37. Mo. Rxv. STAT. § 351.633 (Supp. 1965). The validity of this provision has not
yet been litigated, but a North Carolina statute that is substantially the same has been
upheld. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-145, 146 (1965). Spartan Equip. Co. v. Air Placement
Equip. Co., 263 N.C. 549, 140 S.E. 2d 3 (1965).
38. See note 39 infra and accompanying text.
39. Compare FED. R. Crv. P. 25(a) (1):
If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court within 2 years
after the death may order substitution of the proper parties .... The motion for
substitution may be made by the successors or representatives of the deceased party
and, together with the notice of hearing, shall be served . . . upon persons not
parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a summons, and may
be served in any judicial district,
with Mo. REv. STAT. § 507.100-1 (1959):
If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall on motion
order substitution of the proper parties. The motion for substitution may be made
by the successors or representatives of the deceased party or by the successors or
representatives of the deceased party or by any party and, together with the notice
of the hearing, shall be served... upon persons not parties in the manner provided
for the service of a summons.
40. Neiman-Marcus Co. v. Lait, 17 F.R.D. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Commercial
Solvents Corp. v. Jasspon, 92 F. Supp. 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
41. Wheaton, The New General Code for Civil Procedure and Supreme Court Rules
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plify and liberalize procedure, to the end that litigation shall be expedited
and justice be administered with a minimum of technical procedural hin-
derance" 4 -by giving the Missouri rule the same reading as the federal
rule. Given the court's requirement of specific statutory coverage, how-
ever, it is doubtful that this argument would have succeeded.
Whether one considers the court to be unreasonably restrictive or not,
its position is clear. If the harsh result in Rooney is to be prevented, the
burden falls on the legislature. By now the legislature should be aware of
this.
Interpreted, 13 Mo. L. REv. 433 (1948). Professor Wheaton was the chief drafter of the
Missouri rules.
42. John A. Moore & Co., Inc. v. McConkey, 240 Mo. App. 198, 203, 203 S.W.2d
512, 514 (1947).
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